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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
TERRY WAYNE PERDUE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 900081-CA 
Priority No. 2 
INTRODUCTION 
Defendant/Appellant Terry Wayne Perdue relies on his 
opening brief and also refers this Court to that brief for the 
statements of jurisdiction, the issues, the case, and the facts. 
Appellant responds to the State's answer to his opening brief as 
follows. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Defendant Terry Perdue objected to the jury instructions 
during an "in-chambers" off the record discussion with the State and 
the trial court. Thereafter, the court acknowledged for the record 
that Terry Perdue had made his exceptions. Terry Perdue then 
submitted only one exception, focusing mainly on the reasonable 
doubt instruction. In contrast to the position taken by the State, 
Terry Perdue submits that a negative definition is not enough. The 
defective self defense instruction also compounded the inadequate 
instructions concerning the burden of proof. These inadequacies 
deprived Terry Perdue of a fair trial. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT 
THIS COURT SHOULD CONSIDER THE DEFENDANTS 
CHALLENGES REGARDING THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS 
(Reply to Point I & II of Appellee/s Brief) 
In its brief, the State requested this Court to reject 
Terry Purdue's arguments concerning the challenged jury 
instructions. Appellee's brief at 9. The State argued that 
defendant Perdue had not properly preserved his issues on appeal. 
Appellee's brief at 9-16. The State's criticisms stemmed, in part, 
from the objections made at trial. 
Following the presentation of closing arguments, the 
respective parties and the court discussed the propriety of the jury 
instructions in the judge's chambers. (T 280). The "in chambers" 
conference was conducted off the record. (T 280). Thereafter, the 
court acknowledged for the record that Perdue had made and modified 
multiple exceptions relating to the proposed jury instructions. 
(T 281). Perdue could not recall all of the exceptions although he 
did except to the reasonable doubt instruction: 
The Court: . . . Gentlemen, one other thing while we 
have the record. We have met in chambers, we have 
discussed jury instructions and exceptions have been 
made to jury instructions prior to this time. I 
believe that you would now like to make those a part 
of the record; is that correct? 
Mr. Valdez [Defense counsel]: Yes, your honor. 
Mr. MacDougall [Prosecutor]: The State would have no 
exceptions, your honor. 
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Mr. Valdez: It's my understanding we had made two 
exceptions to jury instructions. And I can only see 
one here. But the first exception would be to the 
instruction the court gave on reasonable doubt, and 
I'll mark that as Exception #1 and provide that to the 
court. Basically it's a longer version of the 
instruction the court gave and has more of a 
clarification we believe and also contains some cites 
of authority that we think supports our position. 
The Court: I believe it is in the packet with the 
file. 
Mr. Valdez: I believe it is. There should be one 
more exceptionf but I can't recall at this point what 
it was. Well, I guess that's it. I can't recall the 
other exception. Was there one or two, do you recall, 
Judge? 
The Court: I recall you making them in chambers, but 
we modified some of the exceptions. 
Mr. Valdez: I think that's the only exception, so 
with that we'll submit it. 
The Court: Very well, court will be in recess. 
(T 280-81) (emphasis added); Appellee's brief at 14. 
The above exchange reflects that Terry Perdue did in fact 
except to the jury instructions during the in chambers conference. 
The court referred repeatedly to his exceptions in the plural tense, 
and not as a singular challenge. The State had no exceptions. 
Perdue's exception was made in a manner similar to an off the record 
objection allowed in State v. Suarez, 135 Utah Adv. Rep. 64, 
67 nn. 3 & 5 (Utah App. 1990). In Suarez, this Court explained: 
Despite the incomplete nature of the record, it is 
apparent that defense counsel made an earlier, timely 
objection. . . . [W]hen defense counsel asked to 
place her objection on the record, the court 
accommodated her request and accepted without comment 
her representation that the objection had been timely 
made but not recorded. We may infer from the court's 
- 3 -
silence that defense counsel in fact made the earlier 
objection in a timely manner as she stated. Although 
the side bar conference should have been recorded, 
defense counsel's later comments on the record were 
sufficient to preserve the issue for appeal. 
Id. at 67 n.5 (citation omitted); see also State v. Dibello, 780 
P.2d 1221, 1229 n.9 (Utah 1989) (where defense counsel preserved his 
issue for appeal by stating, on the record, "I previously stated my 
objection in chambers [off the record] to that [admitting a 
videotape into evidence and] the court overruled that objection"). 
Similarly, in the present case defense counsel's comments 
made on the record also preserved the issue for appeal. Indeed, the 
trial court here did even more than the trial court in Suarez. The 
Suarez trial court simply accommodated defense counsel's request to 
place an objection on the record. The trial court here initiated 
the request. 
The court would not have acted in such a manner if Terry 
Perdue had not previously made a timely and specific objection, nor 
would it have allowed defense counsel to complain of the reasonable 
doubt instruction if it believed that his exception would "invite 
error." Instead, the court accepted without clarification defendant 
Perdue's references to the "instruction the court gave" and even 
acknowledged that "it is in the packet with the file." (T 281). 
Moreover, prior to opening statements (i.e. before defense counsel 
submitted his proposed jury instructions), the court read a 
reasonable doubt instruction virtually identical to the contested 
instruction. Compare (T 13-14) with (R 114). Accordingly, the 
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involved instruction1 may have been a court instruction placed in 
the defendant's "packet" of proposed instructions or it may actually 
have been part of defense counsel's instructions. That fact is 
subject to reasonable dispute given the court's apparent 
acquiescence to the representations made by defendant Perdue and the 
circumstances surrounding the instruction. Hence, in contrast to 
the attacks made by the State, Terry Perdue did not "materially 
[misrepresent] the record on appeal by claiming that '[t]he trial 
court . . . deleted the last three paragraphs of Appellant's 
proposed instructions and modified the first two paragraphs.'" 
Appellee's brief at 11. 
However, for purposes of discussion, Terry Perdue will 
assume the State was correct in claiming that the trial court was 
not the author of the reasonable doubt instruction. Appellee's 
brief at 11 n.2. But see (T 13-14). Assuming the State was 
technically correct, Terry Perdue's arguments are still 
substantively sound because of the court's rejection of the long 
version of his proposed reasonable doubt instruction. (R 60, 61); 
(T 281). By rejecting the longer version in favor of the shorter 
version, the court's actions effectively deleted the last three 
1
 The involved instruction, (R 59, 114), is a standard 
instruction used frequently by the trial courts. See, e.g., 
State v. Haston. Case No. 900021-CA (argued orally September 25, 
1990) (the reasonable doubt instruction used there was submitted by 
the trial court and identical to the instruction questioned today). 
Part of the jury instruction arguments in Haston were excerpted for 
use in the instant action. Because of the similarities between the 
two cases, reference to the Haston case may lend guidance for the 
resolution of this appeal. 
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paragraphs of the reasonable doubt instruction and modified the 
first two paragraphs. By approving the shorter instruction, the 
court remained nonetheless responsible for substantial editing 
changes and revisions. 
The State also criticized the defendant7s jury instruction 
challenges with the following quotation and authority: n/[W]e 
reemphasize this Court's past decisions wherein we stated that 
7invited error7 is procedurally unjustified and viewed with 
disfavor.7 State v. Tillman. 750 P.2d 546, 560-61 (Utah 1987)." 
Appellee's brief at 9. The State, however, failed to include the 
rest of the quoted phrase. The Tillman phrase continued with an 
example of when the doctrine should be invoked. The doctrine is 
"viewed with disfavor, especially where ample opportunity has been 
afforded to avoid such a result." 750 P.2d at 560-61. 
The Tillman Court invoked the doctrine because the defense 
counsel there, unlike defendant Perdue here, did not refer to a 
prior off the record in-chambers discussion. Compare Tillman, 750 
P.2d at 560-61 with (T 281); see also State v. Parsons. 781 P.2d 
1275, 1285 (Utah 1989) (where the court specifically asked defense 
counsel if he was "waiving any possible prejudice resulting from [a 
juror/witness] conversation" to which defense counsel affirmatively 
responded). Terry Perdue did record an exception. (T 281). At 
least in terms of the reasonable doubt instruction, this fact 
distinguishes the many cases cited by the State. See Appellee7s 
brief 9-12; see also State v. Mills. 606 P.2d 1111, 1112 (N.M. App. 
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1980) (since defendant Mills could not complain about a trial court 
giving his requested instruction which included his desired phrase, 
the Mills case is inapposite as the trial court here would not give 
defendant Perdue's requested instruction [i.e. the longer version] 
until his desired phrases were excluded). The State also wrote: 
Defendant actually submitted two proposed instructions 
on reasonable doubt and two proposed instructions on 
self defense.2 (R. 59, 60, 93, 94) The trial court 
chose one of each, mindful that a defendant is not 
entitled to multiple instructions on the same issue. 
State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989); State 
v. Miller. 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 1986). See also 
State v. Reedv, 681 P.2d 1251, 1253 (Utah 1984) 
Appellee's brief at 11 (footnote added); see also Appellant's 
opening brief, Addenda A-D. The State misconstrues its cited 
authority. 
In State v. Moore, 782 P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989), defense 
counsel there, unlike defendant Perdue here, did not make 
alternative arguments to the court. Rather, defendant Moore 
proposed a jury instruction which defined what did not constitute 
"distribution for value." 782 P.2d at 499. The court rejected his 
instruction, replacing it instead with an instruction which 
affirmatively defined the term. id. at 500. On appeal, the Utah 
Supreme Court found that defendant Moore was not entitled to both 
instructions: "The court adequately defined distribution for value 
in instruction No. 5. The court then did not need to define what is 
See infra note 3 and accompanying text. 
- 7 -
not value for purposes of the statute since any distribution which 
did not come within the definition of 'for value' would be 'without 
value.'" Id. (emphasis in original). 
The converse of the Moore principles, however, would not 
hold true in the present situation. The very fact that the 
definition for reasonable doubt fell within the definition for the 
lesser civil standards made the definition inadequate. Moreover, 
the trial court in Moore, unlike the trial court here, approved the 
instruction affirmatively defining the term. Had the trial court 
here approved the longer instruction with the affirmative 
definition, the State's cited authority could apply. But since the 
trial court rejected the longer version and because negative 
definitions were not enough, the State's authority is inapplicable 
to the case at bar. None of the cited authority would have 
precluded defendant Perdue from making alternative arguments if the 
first proposed instruction was rejected (i.e. if his first 
instruction was accepted, Terry Perdue could not also ask for 
another instruction on the same theory). Cf. State v. Moore, 782 
P.2d 497, 500 (Utah 1989); State v. Miller, 727 P.2d 203, 206 (Utah 
1986) (in Miller, "other instructions given in the case amply set 
forth the law on the issues[,]" which contrasts with Terry Perdue's 
instructions because the other instructions further misled the jury 
on the appropriate burden of proof); State v. Reedv, 681 P.2d 1251, 
1253 (Utah 1984) (in Reedy, the Court held, "it is not error to 
refuse an instruction if its content is set out in others[,]" which 
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also contrasts with Terry Perdue's situation because neither the 
short version, nor any of the other instructions set forth the 
substance stated in the long version). 
In regards to the self defense instruction, Terry Perdue 
respectfully requests this Court to address the self defense 
instruction because of the circumstances surrounding the objection3 
and its direct impact on the reasonable doubt instruction. See also 
Appellant's opening brief, Point I.E.; United States v. Pinknev, 551 
F.2d 1241, 1246 n.36 (D.C. Cir. 1976) ("the prejudice caused a 
defendant by error does not somehow evaporate or diminish simply 
because his counsel has failed to object"); cf. State v. Johnson, 
774 P.2d 1141, 1146 (Utah 1989) ("jury instructions are to be 
considered as a whole"). 
The State acknowledges but is not in agreement with Terry 
Perdue's claim of "manifest injustice" as a basis for reviewing the 
jury instruction challenges. Appellee's brief at 15-16. Pursuant 
to the explanation above, the trial court and this Court may have 
3
 Terry Perdue did submit two proposed instructions but 
it appears to be more than a coincidence that he also initially 
believed he "had made two exceptions to [the] jury instructions[,]" 
(T 281) ; that the Court acknowledged Perdue "making them in 
chambers, but we modified some of the exceptions[,]" (T 281); and 
that at least two modified versions pertained to self defense. See 
(R 93, 94); see also Appellant's opening brief, Addenda C & D. 
Other modifications did exist, but none were as central to the 
defendant's theory of the case as the self defense instructions. 
While Terry Perdue ultimately submitted only one exception to the 
court, (T 281), his initial belief, the court's comments, and the 
facts revealed by the record suggest that Perdue made the proper 
objection in-chambers but then could not recall it for the record. 
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already recognized the preservation of the issues. In the 
alternative, however, no one could reasonably argue that manifest 
injustice would not have resulted from a reasonable doubt 
instruction which used a civil standard of proof for a criminal 
conviction, or a self defense instruction which shifted to the 
defendant the burden of persuasion. 
The State did not address the propriety of the challenged 
instructions, even in the alternative, except to the extent that it 
believed that a negative means of defining "reasonable doubt" was 
proper. In footnote four of its brief, the State wrote: 
Justice Stewart has criticized using the language 
"weighty affairs of life" in defining reasonable 
doubt. rState v.1 Johnson, 774 P.2d [1141,] 1148 
(Stewart, J., concurring); \State v."| Ireland, 773 
P.2d [1375,] 1381 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting). [Defendant Perdue's] other proposed 
instruction used the language "weighty affairs of 
life" in defining what the reasonable doubt standard 
was not. The State considers this negative method of 
defining a distinction without a difference. 
Appellee's brief at 15 n.4 (emphasis in original). The State's 
argument is without merit. 
The long version of the reasonable doubt instruction did 
more than negatively define the term; the long version affirmatively 
defined the certainty required for a "reasonable doubt" decision by 
telling the jurors that they "must have a greater assurance of [the] 
correctness of [their] decision than [they] normally have in making 
the weighty decisions in [their lives]." (R 60-61) (emphasis 
added); see Appellant's opening brief, Addendum B. In contrast, the 
short version contains little more than negative definitions or 
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phrases equally applicable to both civil and criminal proceedings. 
(R 114); see Appellants opening brief, Addendum A. By defining 
what a reasonable doubt was not, the short version contained no 
minimal level of proof other than "merely fanciful or imaginary" or 
"a wholly speculative possibility." (R 114). The standard of proof 
for civil trials must also be above these minimal levels. Negative 
definitions4 are wholly inadequate. 
Not only did the court deny Terry Perdue the use of his 
long version, it also effectively precluded him from using examples 
(e.g. getting married, buying a home) during his closing arguments 
which would have emphasized the seriousness of the jurors' 
decision. Although an individual must carefully consider such 
"weighty" decisions, they pale in comparison to the type of 
certainty required for proof "beyond a reasonable doubt." See State 
v. Ireland, 773 P.2d 1375, 1381 (Utah 1989) (Stewart, J., 
dissenting) ("Nothing that one ordinarily does in the course of a 
4
 If someone attempted to define his or her wealth, "rich 
beyond your wildest dreams" (i.e. "proof beyond a reasonable doubt11) 
in a manner distinguishable from "well off" (i.e. "clear and 
convincing"), he or she must do more than define the amount as less 
than the national debt (i.e. "proof to an absolute certainty"). 
Such a negative definition would also apply to the salary of an 
attorney in the S.L. Legal Defender Association (i.e. "merely 
fanciful or imaginary"). 
However, if the individual defined the wealth with a 
standard, the $100 million dollar lottery for example (i.e. the 
"weighty affairs of life"), and explained that "rich beyond your 
wildest dreams" was more than the lottery proceeds (but not as much 
as the national debt), the listener has a complete understanding of 
the term. Without the longer explanatory version, the negative 
definition could apply to any amount of money. 
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normal life span is comparable to the decision to deprive another of 
either his or her life or liberty by voting to convict for a 
crime"). Terry Perdue was denied his opportunity to so inform the 
jury. 
Without the clarification provided by the longer version, 
Terry Perdue could not have been convicted under the required 
criminal standard of proof unless the term, "reasonable doubt," is 
deemed self-explanatory and not subject to definition. "Reasonable 
doubt," however, is a concept foreign to the average layperson 
selected to sit on a jury. Although the term is used and heard 
frequently through various means of communication (e.g. newspapers, 
television, and radio), the term is never adequately defined.5 
The State also contends that the "proposed instruction [the 
long version] offered by defendant [Perdue] contains language 
similar to that rejected by a majority of the Utah Supreme Court." 
Appellee's brief at 15. The State misread each decision. 
In both Ireland and Johnson, the appellate arguments 
submitted by counsel focused on issues entirely different than those 
present in the case at bar. Both cases did not involve an 
affirmative defense, like the self defense theory of Terry Perdue 
5
 Perhaps a helpful analogy can be gleaned through the 
use of the terms, "pregnant" or "labor pains." These terms, like 
the "reasonable doubt" term, are used and heard everyday in the 
community. But husbands, like the average juror, would be remiss in 
believing that they knew what the terms meant absent an adequate 
explanation. (i.e. an expectant mother would have to do more than 
explain that "it doesn't feel good.") 
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Moreover, the Ireland and Johnson cases would not have 
required the jurors to find that the State had disproved the 
defendant's theory. All the State had to prove in those two cases 
was the persuasiveness of its prima facie case. In Terry Perdue's 
trial, however, the self defense instruction improperly required him 
to "bring forward some evidence" in support of his theory and then 
to do so in such a "fashion" that the jury would be convinced of his 
innocence—and not of his guilt. (R 129); see Appellant's opening 
brief, Addendum C. The instruction relieved the State of its burden 
of proof and shifted the burden of persuasion to Terry Perdue. The 
error was especially glaring because the State not only conceded the 
viability of Mr. Perdue's theory, it also agreed that the evidence 
did in fact support his claim of self defense: 
Hermansen [the person who was shot] had the gun and 
was reloading it during the argument. Defendant 
[Perdue] watched Hermansen load three bullets into the 
gun. Defendant demanded that Hermansen return the 
keys. Hermansen refused. Considering himself in 
danger, defendant hit Hermansen with his fist and took 
the revolver. 
Appellee's brief at 4 (citations omitted and emphasis added); see 
also Appellant's opening brief at 5, 27. 
Unlike the situation in Ireland and Johnson, the language 
used in the Perdue instructions could not have corrected the 
improper misstatements of law for both the reasonable doubt 
instruction and the self defense instruction. Furthermore, the 
State here and the Ireland and Johnson decisions completely ignored 
the United States Supreme Court decision of Francis v. Franklin, 471 
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U.S. 307 (1985), a case of fundamental importance to the present 
action. See also Appellant's opening brief, Point I.D. 
In Francis, the Court held unconstitutional the use of a 
mandatory rebuttable presumption which was contained in just two 
sentences of the entire charge read to the jury. 471 U.S. at 318. 
When the jury instructions were read as a whole, the two sentences 
still improperly shifted to the defendant the burden of persuasion 
on the critical element of intent, despite a "portion of the charge 
instructing the jurors that the defendant was presumed innocent and 
that the State was required to prove every element of the offense 
beyond a reasonable doubt." Id. at 319. The dissenting opinions of 
Francis also noted that the instructions "repeatedly reiterated the 
presumption of innocence and the heavy burden imposed upon the 
Statef,]" 471 U.S. at 329 (Powell, J., dissenting), and that "the 
judge admonished the jury at least four separate times that they 
could convict only if they found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." 
Id. at 332 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting, joined by Burger, C.J., and 
O'Connor, J.). 
Nevertheless, the Francis Court explained, "Language that 
merely contradicts and does not explain a constitutionally infirm 
instruction will not suffice to absolve the infirmity. A reviewing 
court has no way of knowing which of the two irreconcilable 
instructions the jurors applied in reaching their verdict. 
Francis v. Franklin. 471 U.S. 307, 323 (1985). The Francis 
principles apply with even greater force here because the multiple 
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defects of Terry Perdue's instructions are far greater than the two 
defective sentences of the Francis instructions. In addition, the 
federal standards would not have required the State to disprove an 
affirmative defense claim of the defendant as the State here was 
required to do with Terry Perdue's claim of self defense. See 
generally Appellant's opening brief, Point I.E. 
In State v. Turner, 736 P.2d 1043 (Utah App. 1987), this 
Court acknowledged the Francis opinion in support of its decision to 
strike down another jury instruction which improperly shifted the 
burden of proof to the defendant. In Turner, the Court found that 
even though "[t]he prosecution's 'burden of proving beyond a 
reasonable doubt all of the elements of the crimes charged' was 
recited in Instructions 7 and 9, and repeated in Instructions 10 and 
11," of defendant Turner's jury instructions, id. at 1044 n.l, the 
"boilerplate explanations" could not absolve the constitutionally 
infirm instructions. Id. at 1045 (construing Francis v. Franklin, 
471 U.S. 307 (1985)). 
Similarly, the boilerplate explanations stated here could 
not have corrected the negatively phrased reasonable doubt 
instruction and the improperly worded self defense instruction in a 
manner which would have not had affected the outcome of the trial. 
In summary, the State cannot claim that the "instruction offered by 
defendant contains language similar to that rejected by a majority 
of the Utah Supreme Court[,]" Appellee's brief at 15, without 
considering the application of Francis v. Franklin, 471 U.S. 307 
(1985), and the vast differences between this case and the Ireland 
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and Johnson decisions. The issues of Ireland and Johnson were fully 
opposed on appeal; the issues here were disputed on little more than 
unjustified procedural grounds. The State offered no substantive 
reasons for upholding the instructions and essentially conceded the 
importance of the self defense instruction by admitting that Terry 
Perdue "consider[ed] himself in danger, . . . " Appellee's brief 
at 4. The errors were neither corrected, nor specifically addressed 
by the general "curative" language stated elsewhere in the 
instructions. Terry Perdue did not receive a fair trial. 
The jury began their deliberations on October 3, 1989, at 
5:20 p.m. (T 279). Following approximately 4 hours and 40 minutes 
of deliberation, the court excused the jury for evening recess. 
(T 283). The jurors left for their homes at 9:58 p.m. (T 283). 
They returned the next day, October 4, 1989, at approximately 
10:15 a.m. (T 284). The jury then continued their deliberations 
until 1:09 p.m. (T 284). After deliberating for approximately 7 
hours and 30 minutes, the jury finally returned their verdict. The 
jurors' decision was not an easy one.6 If their verdict resulted 
6
 If self defense was found to be inapplicable, a 
"manslaughter" verdict would have been proper and more likely under 
an appropriate standard of proof. See Appellant's opening brief, 
Point II. The State misinterprets the cases cited in support of a 
lesser included offense conviction. Appellee's brief at 18 n.5. 
Because of the similarities between the circumstances in the cited 
cases and the circumstances in the present case, the defendant here, 
like the defendants there, should have been convicted of 
manslaughter. The actions taken by Terry Perdue after the shooting 
could have also been consistent with a finding of manslaughter, as 
opposed to second degree murder. 
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from either a standard of proof less demanding than the requisite 
"beyond a reasonable doubt" burden of proof, or a defective self 
defense instruction, or both, manifest injustice occurred. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, Appellant Terry Wayne Perdue 
respectfully requests that his conviction be reversed and the case 
remanded to the trial court for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this day of November, 1990. 
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